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Serial SEOs and capital structure  
 
 




This study investigates whether a firm’s serial seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have an 
impact on its capital structure that is distinct from that of a single SEO firm. Serial SEOs 
are pervasive in our sample of 1,033 UK public firms listed on the London markets. Some 
two thirds are serial SEO issuers—or have made more than one such issue—during the 
1995–2015 sample period. Our findings show that that serial SEO firms have higher 
leverage ratios than single issuers, implying that the additional equity funds are not used to 
pay down debt. Moreover, they indicate that serial issuer cash holdings are sensitive to debt 
changes, but this is not the case with single issuers. Our findings highlight that serial SEO 
issue activity is an important determinant of changes in debt and cash holdings.     
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After an initial public offering (IPO), the issuing firm can and does typically return 
to the market to raise additional equity funds to finance their investment plans. These 
follow-on or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) can either involve public offerings, private 
placements, or a combination of both. Prior studies have extensively explored these SEO 
deals from the perspective of stock liquidity (Butler et al., 2005; Lin and Wu, 2013), 
profitability (Fu, 2010), performance (Andrikopoulos, 2009; DeAngelo et al., 2010; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Ngatuni et al., 2007; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; ) 
and how markets perceive them (Iqbal, 2008; Iqbal et al., 2013; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; 
and Walker et al., 2016). However, only a few researchers have explored serial or multiple 
SEOs by the same firm (D’Mello et al., 2003, Iqbal, 2008, Iqbal et al., 2013, and Walker et 
al., 2016).1 These studies typically have focused on the short and long run performance 
aspects of these new SEOs. To our knowledge, the influence of multiple issues on corporate 
capital structure has yet to be explored, although it has potential to make multiple SEO 
issuers’ capital structure significantly different from that of single SEO issuers. This 
difference may raise agency cost concerns for bondholders and potential investors.  
In contrast to the extant literature, this paper examines the relationship between 
serial SEOs and the firm’s capital structure. More particularly, it investigates whether the 
motivation for seeking additional SEO funds is to reduce existing debt, improve cash 
holdings, or both. It thus examines to what extent serial SEOs affect firm leverage ratios 
and whether there are differences in cash and debt management policies between serial and 
single SEO issuer firms. This study is based on a sample of 1,033 publicly-listed UK firms 
issuing equity during the 1995–2015 period and listed on the London Main Market (MM) 
 
1 We employ the concept of serial SEOs as it implies that the issues are conducted by the same firm whilst the 
term “multiple” equity issues can be ambiguous. The term frequent issues is also used in prior literature (see 
for example D’Mello et al., 2003) but that presupposes a short time span between serial issues. 
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or Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Typically, young firms with high growth 
prospects are attracted to the lightly regulated AIM (Vismara, 2012), while more established 
and larger firms issue equity on the MM. The conventional rationale for raising equity 
finance has revolved around the exercise of growth options where firms may, quite rightly, 
use the new equity funds to reduce their leverage (Hertzel and Li, 2010).  
This paper establishes that serial SEO issuers have become a pervasive feature of 
the London markets. As such, studies that treat all SEOs as first issue fail to account for the 
reduction in information asymmetries and moral hazard that accompanies serial SEOs by 
the same issuer. Our data reveals that some two thirds (65%) of our sample are serial SEO 
issuers or have conducted more than one SEO during the sample period. Out of the 666 
serial issuers, the majority (62%) are firms listed on AIM. On average, AIM firms issue 
equity 5.04 times while MM firms issue 4.15 times. By contrast, Iqbal et al. (2015) and 
Walker et al. (2016) find that their multiple SEO firms make an average of just 2.46 and 
2.43 SEO issues, respectively, for samples that end in 2008 and 2012, respectively. 
Our results indicate that serial SEO firms have higher leverage than single issuers. 
On average, serial issuers have higher growth and lower short-term to total-debt ratios. 
Serial issuers generally do not reduce their existing debt even though they have additional 
funds from issuing equity. This motivates us to investigate whether serial issuers have a 
different cash flow sensitivity of debt relative to single issuers. Our findings show that both 
serial and single issuers tend to increase their cash holdings when there is an increase in 
their cash flow. We further investigate whether such patterns differ between firms listed on 
London Main Market (MM) and firms listed on Alternative Investment Market (AIM). We 
find that AIM firms tend to increase their cash holdings when there is an increase in cash 
flow. Firms listed on MM, particularly for single issuers, change both their debt and cash 
holding positions when there is a change in cash flow. Finally, we examine the debt and 
4 
 
cash holding sensitivity to cash flow of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We 
find that multiple and single issuers, both constrained and unconstrained, increase their cash 
holdings when cash flow increases. However, our results show that only constrained 
multiple issuers change their debt positions when there is a cash flow change.  
Our study offers important insights into the nexus between SEOs—both serial and 
single—and capital structure. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
document evidence that serial issuers maintain higher debt levels than do single issuers, a 
pattern seen among firms both on the Main Market and on AIM. When additional cash 
becomes available, firms exhibit clear difference in their preferences between changing their 
debt or cash holdings. We also find differences in the ways MM and AIM firms employ 
new SEO injections of equity. While MM firms change both their debt and cash positions 
when they obtain new equity funds from SEOs, AIM issuers primarily focus on changing 
their cash holdings. 
Our study contributes to the SEO literature on multiple equity offerings, highlighting 
the nexus between multiple equity offerings and capital structure. We consider that filling 
this gap in the literature is important, as raising financing has an impact on the capital 
structure of the issuing firm, even more so when a firm repeatedly returns to the markets to 
issue more equity as a serial issuer. Our work further provides practical implications; 
whether approaching from the position of an investor willing to invest in equity issued by 
single or serial issuers or from the position of the management of the equity issuers, our 
findings provide useful insight. First, serial issuers are more leveraged compared to single 
issuers, and this is a factor that a potential investor should take into consideration. Second, 
our results show that the market in which the issuing company is listed (MM or AIM in our 
case) plays a role in the sensitivity of cash holdings and debt positions when there is an 
increase in cash flow. Finally, our findings reveal that financial constraint can affect the use 
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of the equity proceeds raised, thus some firms may need to consider whether serial SEOs 
are the best choice for them. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant past studies and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and empirical methods. Section 4 
discusses our empirical findings, and Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1  Frequency of seasoned equity issues 
SEO firms can issue equity publicly via rights issues or open offers and/or privately 
with institutional investors via private placements or PIPEs (private investment in public 
equity). While there is no formal restriction on how many times firms can issue equity, they 
can choose to have multiple seasoned offerings only if they are assured by their advisors 
that the market will react positively to such announcements (Chakraborty and Gantchev, 
2013; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Ngatuni et al., 2007; Slovin et al., 2000; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995). To achieve the final target of securing necessary funds at the best 
possible terms, the issuing firm may employ public equity issues or private equity 
placements, or a combination of the two. 
Firms have alternative ways of getting access to funding, including bank loans and 
issuing debt instruments as well as raising equity. These financing outcomes dynamically 
affect firms’ capital structure. While most previous studies have focused on analysis of a 
single type of external financing event, Billett et al. (2011) examine different types of 
external financing and explore firms’ underperformance following external financing, 
providing new insights into raising different types of funds. They consider a range of 
external fund raising (IPOs, SEOs, bank loans, public debt offerings and private equity 
offerings) conducted by US firms and provide evidence that the use of multiple financing 
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patterns leads to worse performance than single events. Their results imply that 
underperformance is not necessarily caused by external capital raising. Rather, it is linked 
with the frequency and the variety of sources of external financing. 
The prior literature has extensively explored different aspects related to SEOs. These 
include measuring SEO firms’ performance and market reaction before, around and after 
the announcement of the SEO deal, exploring different factors that could explain the 
abnormal returns observed, examining discounts and their potential drivers around SEOs, 
and analysing the role of management and underwriters; the spectrum covered is vast (see 
for example Andrikopoulos, 2009; Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013; DeAngelo et al., 2010; 
Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Ngatuni et al., 2007; Slovin et 
al., 2000; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). Each equity issue conducted by a firm is treated 
by most researchers as an independent event in their sample of events during the period 
examined. It remains an empirical question, however, whether these equity issue events are 
truly independent. Firm characteristics, including size, leverage, and growth, may change 
after each equity issue. Not all companies issue equity multiple times, either because it is 
too costly for them and/or because they have secured access to alternative sources. 
Only a few studies have examined multiple equity issues, focusing mainly on the 
performance of frequent versus infrequent issuers and providing some interesting insights. 
D’Mello et al. (2003) examine the relation between the sequence of SEOs and 
announcement returns for 2,286 equity deals conducted by industrial, financial, and utility 
firms during 1979–1996. The results from the industrial subsample of firms show that, in 
each successive equity issue, investors react less negatively. The level of information 
asymmetry decreases each time a firm issues equity, and lower information asymmetry 
decreases the adverse selection costs investors face in an equity issue. This implies a less 
negative market reaction upon the announcement of a follow-on deal. D’Mello et al. claim 
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that equity issuers are aware of the information asymmetry decline and its advantages. Thus, 
during subsequent equity issues, firms both issue more capital and shorten the time period 
between successive SEOs. 
Building upon and extending the work of D’Mello et al. (2003), Iqbal (2008) 
examines market reaction to the announcement of rights issues in the UK during 1988–
1998, taking into consideration the sequence in which companies conduct multiple rights 
issue deals. He uses a sample of 569 rights issues by 243 UK firms in the industrial and 
financial sectors and finds that the negative market reaction after the announcement of the 
rights issues diminishes after the first and becomes insignificant after the third issue. His 
study provides evidence that the decline in information asymmetry is the reason behind the 
less negative market reaction at or after the third rights issue announcement. Relatedly, Iqbal 
et al. (2013) study the long-run performance of UK firms conducting multiple right issues 
between 1988 and 2008. Their analysis provides evidence that 53% of the rights issues in 
the UK are conducted by firms which make two or more issues during the sample period. 
They also find that companies issuing equity three times or more do not experience 
significant long-run underperformance. Their findings underline the importance of 
distinguishing between frequent and infrequent equity issuers as opposed to studying all 
equity issuing firms as a homogenous group. 
The implication of the above studies is that investors perceive multiple SEOs as a 
signal of good quality and thus believe that investing in them is better than investing in 
single issuers. Reinforcing this argument, Walker et al. (2016) find that multiple SEOs can 
be used by equity issuing firms to build credibility with the market. Similar results were 
also found in Humphery-Jenner et al. (2018). Capital markets appear to have a long memory 
and reward or penalize an equity issuing firm when it returns to raise funds in a follow-on 
deal, based on the performance during its previous SEO. In other words, it is likely that 
8 
 
well-performing firms return to the market to raise additional financing which is in line with 
the results of Hovakimian and Hutton (2010). 
Based on the above evidence, issuing equity multiple times sends a positive signal 
to investors on the quality of the issuing firm. The markets would not repetitively accept 
equity from poorly-performing firms. Additionally, multiple equity issuing can also be seen 
as a mechanism to build credibility and reduce the information asymmetry between firms 
and the market. By raising funds multiple times through SEOs, it is likely that an issuing 
firm will increase in size, become better known to investors and the markets, and be more 
extensively studied by market analysts than an infrequent issuer. Thus, the asymmetric 
information between the frequent equity issuer and investors might be reduced. However, 
once the prospectus and other floatation costs are considered, one might wonder whether 
repeatedly issuing equity is a costly way of reducing information asymmetries. In short, the 
issuance cost of equity depends on different factors. For example, the type of equity issue 
(public issuance of equity versus private placement of equity), the need (or not) to issue a 
prospectus and how extensive this document should be, the discount that the issuer will 
offer, how overvalued or undervalued is the firm and the market on which the equity issuing 
company is listed are all important variables. 
Our study focuses on companies listed either on the London primary Main Market 
(MM) or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). AIM, established in 1995, is a 
secondary exchange regulated market. It is a platform for small firms with good growth 
prospects to get listed in the IPO market and return to raise additional financing through 
SEOs. London MM and AIM tend to attract different companies with different financing 
and investment agendas (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). In the post-IPO period, AIM companies 
are more active in SEOs, while MM firms get involved in acquisitions, capital changes and 
dividend announcements. Also, many companies (UK and international) choose to list on 
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AIM because the listing and on-going costs are lower; AIM provides a light-touch 
regulatory approach to issuing firms. However, it is this regulatory approach that has created 
controversy regarding the quality of AIM as a listing platform. Though evidence shows that 
firms listed on AIM underperform in the long-run (Gerakos et al., 2013), AIM has gained 
popularity among firms throughout the world. These differences between London MM and 
AIM are the main reason we separately study these two markets. 
 Taking into consideration the differences between AIM and MM, this study explores 
the impact of serial equity issues by the same issuer on capital structure. Prior literature 
establishes that a non-negligible proportion of firms conduct SEOs (Iqbal et al., 2008, 2013; 
Walker et al., 2016). Based on the reported prior evidence our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Serial equity issues have become pervasive on the London markets. 
Compared to the Main Market (MM), firms in the AIM market are rather small and 
are generally considered to be more risky. It is, therefore, difficult for such firms to issue 
debt. However, they can employ the equity channel, especially Private Placements (PPs) of 
equity. As a result, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: AIM firms are more active serial SEO issuers than firms on the MM.  
2.2  Capital structure literature 
In the course of their operations, companies need financing for various purposes, 
such as investing in profitable (or not) projects, reducing debt, adjusting to optimal target 
leverage ratios, acquiring other firms, financing R&D, and covering working capital needs. 
The three main sources of financing that firms employ are: internally generated funds, debt, 
and equity. The prior literature has developed three different theories to explain how firms 
make decisions about their capital structure: pecking order, market timing, and trade-off 
theory. The pecking order theory, first developed by Myers and Majluf (1984), states that, 
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because it is the most costly, equity is the least-preferred method by which firms might 
acquire funds.  
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of capital structure of firms. For 
example, Ozkan (2001) employs panel data and investigates the determinants of target 
capital structure as well as the role of the adjustment process for UK firms. He provides 
evidence that GMM estimation is more suitable than that of OLS when exploring potential 
determinants of capital structure. He finds that the sample UK firms have long-term target 
leverage ratios and that they adjust to these target ratios relatively quickly. He also 
establishes a negative relationship between liquidity, profitability, growth prospects, non-
debt tax shields and the leverage ratios of firms. Brav (2009) conducts an important study 
on the firm-specific determinants of leverage. He finds evidence that the firm-specific 
factors that have previously been employed in the literature (profitability, growth prospects, 
capital expenditures, tangibility of assets, size of the firm, short-term to total-debt ratio and 
age) can explain the leverage of both private and publicly listed firms. 
While firm-specific factors appear important in explaining the capital structure of 
firms, other factors may also play a role. Jong et al. (2008) study both firm- and country-
specific factors affecting leverage in 42 countries. They find that several firm-specific 
factors (size of the firm, tangibility, growth, risk, profitability) do influence leverage but 
their primary focus is on the direct and indirect impact of country-specific factors on firms’ 
corporate structures. The indirect impact of country-specific factors is related to how these 
factors affect firm-specific factors and, consequently, the choice of capital structure. Along 
similar lines, Gungoraydinoglu and Oztekin (2011) explore firm- and country-level 
determinants of capital structure in 37 countries. Using a comprehensive set of firm-specific 
variables as well as proxies for the firms’ institutional environment, they find that firm-level 
covariates explain two thirds of capital structure variations, while country-level factors are 
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responsible for the remainder. Institutional factors that have an impact on bankruptcy costs 
and taxes may affect heterogeneity in capital structures across countries and are more 
relative to factors affecting agency and information asymmetry costs. 
According to one stream of capital structure literature, firms have target leverage 
ratios and they try to adjust their positions to stay close to the leverage target. Different 
factors may affect the speed of adjustment to the optimal targeted leverage ratio. There are 
benefits but also costs to firms when adjusting their capital structures towards the target 
leverage. Ultimately, the firm’s decision to adjust capital structure and its speed of 
adjustment depends on a cost-benefit analysis. Antoniou et al. (2008) study the choice of 
capital structure choice in bank- and capital-market oriented economies. They find that the 
size of the firm and tangibility of assets exhibit a positive relationship with leverage, while 
profitability, growth prospects and share price performance have a negative one in both 
types of economies. Their results also suggest that firms adjust leverage to stay close to their 
target capital structure. They conclude that both firm-specific factors as well as firms’ 
economic environment affect their capital structure decisions. 
Cook and Tang (2010) explore the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the 
speed of capital structure adjustment over a 30-year period and find that firms adjust their 
leverage toward the target leverage ratio more quickly when these conditions are good. 
Their findings are significant in light of the recent global financial crisis in which poor 
macroeconomic conditions may have left companies unable to quickly adjust their capital 
structure to reach their target leverage. Another important factor affecting capital structure 
and the speed of adjustment towards target leverage is the regulatory environment of the 
company. Along these lines, Oztekin and Flannery (2012) find that in their sample of 37 
countries during 1991–2006, the effectiveness of the legal and financial institutions in a 
country affects the costs and benefits of converging toward the optimal target leverage ratio.  
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Another strand of the literature investigates the interaction between liquidity and 
leverage. One such recent study is that of Andres et al. (2014). They document a link 
between capital structure and information asymmetry. More specifically, they explore the 
impact that target capital structure decisions have on information asymmetries between the 
firms and the market. Information asymmetries are proxied by equity liquidity. Their results 
show that a decrease in leverage leads to a decrease in liquidity which, in turn, is interpreted 
as an increase in information asymmetry.  
Since a firm’s capital structure is related to its sources and uses of funds, our next 
testable implication is: 
Hypothesis 3: Serial SEOs have an impact on a firm’s leverage.   
We further conjecture that there is a difference in capital structure between serial 
issuers and single issuers. Since serial issuers are likely to be higher risk, higher growth 
firms than single issuers and are more likely listed on the AIM than on the Main Market, 
they will likely employ the proceeds differently from single issuers. There is also the 
possibility that serial issuers are receiving stage finance as part of a program of growth and 
investment. The demand for cash holdings and for urgent debt reduction will differ between 
single issuers and serial issuers. Hence these two groups of firms are likely to employ the 
equity proceeds differently for debt reductions and cash holding increases. As such, serial 
issuers’ cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings are expected to be different than 
those of single issuers. This leads to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Serial and single SEOs have different cash flow sensitivity of debt and 
cash holdings. 
3.  Sample, data and empirical methods 
3.1  Sample of SEO deals 
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Data on all follow-on or SEO deals by UK equity issuers are collected from the 
Thomson ONE database over the 1995–2015 period. Only SEO deals occurring in the UK 
public domain are included; IPOs and deals where only secondary shares are sold are 
excluded.2 Our sample considers the main equity sources available to a firm on London’s 
two markets, the Main Market (MM) and AIM.3 After applying the above criteria, we match 
the sample with available Datastream data4 to yield a sample of 1,263 UK issuers. Out of 
this initial sample of issuers, we exclude firms that do not have all the available accounting 
and market data needed for our analysis, leaving a final sample of 1,033 firms.  
Table 1 shows the numbers of serial and single SEO firms and the average number 
of SEOs per firm on London’s MM and AIM.5  
[Table 1 around here] 
More AIM-listed firms engage in SEOs (567) compared to those listed on MM (466). 
Taking both markets together, 65% of firms are serial SEO issuers and 35% are single SEO 
firms. It is interesting to note that serial SEO issuers are not simply an AIM characteristic. 
Indeed, the majority of firms on both markets are serial issuers, but the proportion on AIM 
is higher: 55% of MM and 73% AIM firms are serial issuers. This supports Hypothesis 1, 
that serial SEO issues have become pervasive. Overall, the average number of SEOs by 
serial issuers is 4.70. The mean number of serial issues on AIM (5.04) is larger than that on 
the MM (4.15), and the difference is statistically significant. 
3.2  Baseline specification and variables 
Several studies have examined the determinants of leverage in different time periods 
 
2 We also exclude Units and Registration cases as well as Vendor placings. 
3 This means that we exclude from our sample 21 firms listed on PLUS, OFEX or there is no available 
information about their listing. 
4 SEDOL numbers as well as manual matching, where needed, are used. 
5 Strictly speaking, a single SEO firm may have conducted an SEO prior to the beginning of our sample period, 
but we are unable to check this with the available data. Walker et al. (2016) refer to these as first-in-sample 
SEOs to stress this point. 
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and markets. In this paper, we explore whether serial SEO issues play a role in determining 
the leverage of firms by employing an extension of the Brav (2009) methodology. The 
following baseline model is estimated: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (1) 
where Leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of debt over market value of assets 
(market leverage). The Serial Issuers variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has 
conducted more than one SEO during the sample period and 0 otherwise. Other explanatory 
variables include proxies for size, profitability and tangibility of assets. More specifically, 
these variables include return on assets (ROA), firm’s Growth measured by turnover 
changes, capital expenditures (CAPEX), Tangible assets, firm’s Size (measured by total 
assets), the ratio of short-term debt over total debt (Short to Total Debt) and the firm’s Age. 
More detailed definitions for the independent variables are provided in Appendix A. The 
independent variables are lagged by one period to mitigate potential endogeneity issues. 
Our regressions include fixed effects for year and sectors at the two-digit SIC level. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables employed.6 All the variables 
with the exception of the serial SEO dummy are winsorised at the 1% level on both tails. 
Columns 1 to 3 in Panel A contain information about the full SEO sample while columns 4 
to 6 and 7 to 9 gives the details of serial and single issuers, respectively. Panel A reports 
statistics for means and medians for the whole sample as well as for serial and single issuers. 
Our discussion is primarily focused on these results. Panel B of Table 2 provides additional 
descriptive statistics on the distribution of the variables (minimum, maximum, standard 
 
6 The data have been winsorised at 1% level in both the tails of the distribution. As an additional check, we 




deviation, and the values for the 5% and 95% percentiles) for serial and single issuers. 
[Table 2 around here] 
Over the sample period, serial SEO firms have significantly7 higher average leverage 
(0.240) than do single SEO firms (0.214). Serial issuers enjoy higher growth (1.331 versus 
1.260), poorer performance in terms of ROA (-0.084 versus -0.017), and a lower ratio of 
short term to total debt ratio (0.457 versus 0.483). All the latter differences are significant 
at the 5% level or better. These results indicate that serial SEO firms are highly leveraged 
firms that need to finance their growth prospects. The data show that serial issuers are 
significantly larger than single issuers (4.649 versus 4.608) when we look at average values, 
but the median values are very similar.  
Table 3 provides additional information about the correlation of the variables used 
in our regression analysis. None of the correlation coefficients exceeds 0.5, so 
multicollinearity should not be an issue in our regression analysis. 
[Table 3 around here] 
The above findings show how serial and single issuing firms differ and motivate an 
investigation of whether serial issuers have a different cash flow sensitivity of debt 
compared to that of single issuers. Thus, we explore the impact of an increase in cash flow 
on the debt and cash holdings in these two subgroups of issuers. Empirically, we follow 
Acharya et al. (2007) and estimate the cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings using 
a 3SLS (three-stage-least-squares) system of equations. This method combines 2SLS (two-
stage-least squares) with SUR (seemingly unrelated regression). Its merit in this context is 
that it allows correlations of the unobserved disturbances across the different equations of 
 
7 The Welch approximation is used when t-statistics are calculated. Welch t-test is a modification of the 
Student t-test, which allows one to check if two sample means are significantly different without the 
assumption of equal variances and sample sizes. 
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the system. This methodology makes intuitive sense, because cash flow increases can be 
used to change debt positions, cash holdings, or both at the same time. The system of 
equations estimated is the following: 
𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀
𝑑  𝑖,𝑡                  (2) 
𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀
𝑐 𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where ΔDebt is defined as the ratio of changes in long-term debt over total book value of 
assets, while ΔCash Hold is the ratio of changes in cash and equivalents over total assets. 
The definitions of all control variables can be found in Appendix A. 
We first examine the sensitivity of debt and cash holdings to changes in cash flow 
for the overall sample as well as for the serial and single (SEO) issuer subsamples. We also 
explore the cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings of serial and single issue firms 
listed on the Main Market and on AIM to test for a possible stock exchange impact. Finally, 
we test whether financially constrained serial issuers prefer higher cash to lower debt than 
do financially unconstrained serial issuers. 
For the results of financially constrained versus unconstrained firms, we run the 
same set of regressions for serial and single issuers while we distinguish between 
constrained and unconstrained firms using three different methods. Firm size is the first 
proxy we use for financial constraints.8 This approach sorts firms by asset size into deciles 
each year. Firms in the top (bottom) three deciles are deemed to be the unconstrained 
(constrained) firms. Two further proxies for financial constraints are used for robustness 
 
8 This approach is often used in literature with the rationale that, as firms grow larger, they are less likely to 
be financially constrained. 
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purposes: the dividend payout ratio and the SA (size-age) index developed by Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010). The former approach ranks firms by their dividend payout ratio—defined as 
dividends per share over earnings per share—into deciles each year. The firms in the top 
(bottom) three deciles are the unconstrained (constrained) firms. The SA index was 
developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Its main underlying idea is that, as firms grow 
older and larger, they are less likely to be financially constrained. They find a linear 
relationship between age and constraints as well as a quadratic one between size and 
constraints. The index is calculated as: 
SA index = (-0.737 * Size) + (0.043 * Size2) – (0.040 * Age)   (4) 
where age is the number of years a firm is listed while size is the natural logarithm of the 
inflation-adjusted book value of assets. We adjust for inflation by employing 2005 as the 
base year.  
4.  Empirical findings 
4.1  Leverage for serial and single SEO issuers 
Table 4 presents the results of the determinants of leverage. Columns 1 and 4 give 
the results for the entire UK SEO sample while columns 2, 3 and 5, 6 report results for firms 
listed on the Main Market and on AIM, respectively. The variable of particular interest is 
the serial (SEO) issuer dummy. The results in columns 1 to 3 for our full sample indicate 
that the serial issuer dummy variable is significantly positive at the 1% level with a 
coefficient of 0.029. This implies that firms which serially engage in SEOs have higher 
leverage ratios. The serial issuer dummy has a significantly positive separate impact on AIM 
and MM firms at the 5% level with coefficients of 0.028 and 0.026, respectively. These 
results provide evidence that being a serial issuer has a positive impact on leverage of 
between 2.6% and 2.8% across these markets.  
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[Table 4 around here] 
The return on assets (ROA) coefficient is significant negatively only for MM (-
0.069) at the 5% significance level. The Growth variable is insignificant in all regressions. 
By contrast, the coefficients on capital expenditures (CAPEX) are significantly negative in 
all regressions, consistent with the trade-off theory. The tangibility of assets and size (with 
one exception) variables are always statistically significant and positive. These imply that 
firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets and larger firms tend to be more leveraged. 
Our results regarding the impact of size on debt ratios are in line with the findings of Brav 
(2009). The Short-to-total Debt ratio is significantly negative for the whole sample as well 
as in each of the two market subsamples. This finding implies that firms with a larger 
amount of short-term debt (due to be repaid back within a year) tend to have lower leverage. 
Finally, the results show a significantly positive relationship between age and debt ratios. 
However, the coefficients on age are significant for the aggregate sample and the AIM (but 
not the MM) subsample at the 1% level. This finding suggests that older firms in our sample 
tend to have higher leverage.9 
As argued by Brav (2009), profitability may appear significant in the regression 
results not because it affects the debt ratios per se, but rather because it could move a firm’s 
leverage away from the target leverage level (see also Hovakimian et al., 2001). Thus, we 
re-estimate our baseline model excluding the ROA variable. Columns 4 to 6 show that the 
serial issuer dummy remains significantly positive and that the economic impact remains 
very similar across the full sample as well as the MM and AIM subsamples. In other words, 
our results for serial issuers are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the profitability 
 
9 The dependent variable in the regressions is market value leverage. However, the same set of regressions 
using book value (book value of debt/book value of assets) leverage (results not reported here) yields 
qualitatively similar results. 
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measure captured by ROA. 
4.2  Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings 
Table 5 presents the results of the 3SLS regressions (Equations 2 and 3). Columns 1 
and 2 show the results on the cash flow sensitivity for debt and cash holding changes for the 
entire sample. Columns 3 and 4 (columns 5 and 6) show the results of cash flow sensitivity 
of debt and cash holdings for serial (single) SEO issuers.  
[Table 5 around here] 
The full sample results show a positive and significant coefficient for cash flow in 
both the change in debt and cash holdings regressions. A similar pattern holds for the 
subsample of serial SEO firms, but the coefficient of cash flow for single issuers in the debt 
change regression is insignificant. The findings suggest that firms alter their debt and cash 
holding positions when they experience an increase in their cash flow. For the serial SEO 
sample, the coefficient of cash flow on the debt issuance regression is positive (0.015) but 
significant at the 10% level only. At the same time, the cash holding regression findings 
show that the cash flow coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level in both the 
serial and single SEO subsamples (0.154 and 0.193 respectively). The results show that 
companies in both the subsamples increase their cash holdings following an increase in cash 
flow with a higher cash flow coefficient for single than for serial SEO issuers. Interestingly, 
serial issuers also alter their debt positions when there is a cash flow change. 
Table 6 reports results for firms listed on the Main Market in columns 1 to 4 and on 
AIM in columns 5 to 8. We observe a similar pattern for the cash flow coefficient to that in 
Table 5. A change in cash flow for both serial and single SEO issuers listed on the MM 
leads to a change in their cash holding and debt positions. The cash flow coefficient is higher 
in the cash holdings regressions. These findings suggest that MM firms—both serial and 
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single SEO issuers—alter their debt and cash holdings following an increase in cash flow. 
However, the cash flow coefficients on debt for AIM firms are insignificant for both serial 
and single issuers. On the other hand, the coefficients in the cash holding regressions are 
positive and significant at the 1% level for both subsamples. These results suggest that AIM 
firms, which are usually small firms and considered risky compared to MM firms, tend to 
increase their cash holdings following an increase in cash flow. Taken together, the cash 
flow sensitivity of cash holdings for MM firms is higher than that for AIM firms. MM firms 
also exhibit significant cash flow sensitivity to net debt changes, particularly single issuers. 
[Table 6 around here] 
To summarise, our findings on sensitivity of cash holding and debt positions when 
there is an increase in cash flow reveal a different pattern for MM- and AIM-listed firms. 
MM issuers, both serial and in particular single ones, change both their cash holdings and 
debt positions when there is a change in cash flow. However, AIM-listed firms issuing 
equity once or multiple times tend to increase their cash holdings when there is an increase 
in cash flow without changing their debt positions.  
4.3  Further analysis with financial constraints 
This section analyses whether financial constraints play a role in the sensitivity of 
debt and cash holdings to cash flow changes for serial and single SEO issuers. Table 7 uses 
firm size as a proxy for distinguishing financially constrained from unconstrained firms.  
[Table 7 around here] 
Panel A shows the results of cash flow sensitivity of debt for constrained and 
unconstrained firms in the aggregate sample (columns 1 and 2), serial issuers (columns 3 
and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Similarly, the results of the cash flow sensitivity 
of cash holdings are reported in Panel B. The Panel A results indicate that the coefficient on 
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cash flow is positive (0.028) and significant at the 5% level for constrained serial issuers 
but insignificant for unconstrained firms. This finding suggests that the relationship between 
cash flow and changes in debt is a positive one for constrained serial SEO firms. The results 
for the cash flow sensitivity of debt for the single issuer subsample are insignificant for both 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Financially constrained firms that issue equity 
multiple times seem to change their debt positions when there is an increase in cash flow. 
Panel B indicates a significantly (at the 1% level) positive relationship between cash holding 
and cash flow changes for both constrained and unconstrained firms for both serial and 
single issuers. Our findings suggest that serial and single issuers—irrespective of financial 
constraints—increase their cash holdings when there is an increase in cash flow.  
 Overall, our results suggest that single SEO firms, irrespective of financial 
constraints, increase their cash holdings rather than change their debt following a cash flow 
increase. The same applies for serial SEO firms. However, constrained serial issuers change 
both their debt and cash holding positions following an increase in cash flow. These findings 
are intuitive, since financially constrained firms that return multiple times in the markets to 
raise financing have an incentive to use some of the proceeds to improve their debt positions. 
Since the prior literature has employed different methods for distinguishing 
financially constrained from unconstrained firms, we employ two additional methods in our 
analysis. Two additional proxies are used: the dividend payout ratio (Table 8) and the size-
age index (SA index) (Table 9). Table 8 Panel A shows our findings for the cash flow 
sensitivity of debt for the entire sample (columns 1 and 2), serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) 
and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). The coefficient of cash flow is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for constrained firms in the aggregate sample and in the 
subsample of serial SEO firms. The results for the cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings in 
Panel B of Table 8 are consistent with our findings in Table 7. The coefficient of cash flow 
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is positive and significant at least at the 5% level for the aggregate sample as well as for the 
serial and single SEO firm subsamples, irrespective of whether they are constrained or 
unconstrained. 
[Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
The SA index results are similar to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. Table 9 Panel 
A shows that the cash flow sensitivity of debt is positive for constrained firms in the 
aggregate sample as well as for serial SEO firms, as found previously. Interestingly, the 
cash flow coefficient now becomes significant for unconstrained firms in both the aggregate 
sample and the serial issuers subsample. Similar to our findings in Tables 7 and 8, the cash 
flow coefficients in Panel B of Table 9 are all positive and significant for all samples and 
for constrained and unconstrained firms. In other words, overall, our findings are robust to 
different methods of distinguishing financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
4.4  Alternative serial issuers dummy variable 
We now define the serial issuer dummy as taking the value of 1 if the company 
conducted more than one SEO after the current period and not over the full sample period 
1995–2015; otherwise, the value is 0. The rationale for our new dummy is to capture the 
influence of the serial SEOs on capital structure in subsequent years. 
 The new set of results can be found in Table 10 while Table 11 gives corresponding 
results on the cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings. The coefficient of the serial 
issuer dummy in Table 10 has positive impact leverage which is statistically significant only 
for the MM but not for AIM. The cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings, on average, 
do not vary significantly in Table 11 when using the alternative for serial issuer definition. 
The coefficient of interest (Cash Flow) remains positive, but it is significant only in the 
cases of changes in cash holdings.  
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[Tables 10 and 11 around here] 
This pattern is observed also when the analysis distinguishes between serial and 
single issuers on the MM versus AIM in Table 12. The one exception is single issuers listed 
on the MM where the cash flow coefficient is significant for both changes in debt and cash 
holdings. Serial and single issuers on AIM as well as serial issuers listed on the MM increase 
their cash holdings when there is an increase in cash flow. Single issuers listed on MM 
change both their debt and cash holding positions when there is an increase in cash flow. 
These results are consistent with our previous findings, implying that our results are not 
dependent on the serial issuer definition used. 
[Table 12 around here] 
The results based on our three different financial constraint proxies are reported in 
Appendix B: Tables B1, B2, and B3. The Cash Flow coefficient remains positive for 
changes in cash holdings irrespective of the definition used for serial issuers. Similarly, 
when the dividend payout ratio and SA index are used to distinguish financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms, the coefficient of the variable of interest remain qualitatively the 
same. The implication of this additional analysis is that our findings are robust to the 
alternative definition of the dummy variable for serial and single issuers. 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper employs a sample of 1,033 UK firms over the 1995–2015 period to 
explore whether serial SEO issues have an impact on the companies’ capital structure. Firms 
need financing for their operations, to fund their growth prospects and to make investments 
or reduce debt. Serial SEO issues confer upon firms the option to reduce their indebtedness 
at each issue. In this light, we investigate in this study whether serial issuers tend to have 
lower leverage ratios. Furthermore, we test whether serial issuers’ capital structure differ 
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between AIM and MM firms. AIM firms are, on average, small companies (SMEs) and are 
considered to be riskier than firms listed on the MM.  
We find that two thirds (65%) of the sample firms are serial issuers, confirming that 
serial SEOs have become a pervasive phenomenon. Of these, some three fifths (62%) are 
AIM firms. On average, an AIM firm conducts 5.04 SEOs and MM firms 4.15 SEOs, a 
difference that is statistically significant. Thus, results show that serial SEOs are not just an 
AIM phenomenon and confirm the rise of serial SEOs. Moreover, serial SEO firms have 
higher leverage ratios and growth rates but lower short-term to total-debt ratios relative to 
single issuers. These findings imply that serial issuers do not use the additional equity funds 
to reduce their short-term debt.  
We further investigate the sensitivity of debt and cash holdings to changes in cash 
flow for both serial and single SEO firms. Our results show that both serial and single issuers 
increase their cash holdings following an increase in the cash flow. Moreover, serial SEO 
issuers change their debt positions when cash flow increases. AIM firms increase their post-
SEO cash holdings when there is an increase in cash flow, while MM firms, particularly 
single SEO issuers, change both their corresponding debt and cash holding positions 
following a cash flow change. Finally, serial and single SEO issuers, whether constrained 
or not, increase their post-SEO cash holdings when cash flow increases. Our results are 
robust to fixed effects, different approaches to distinguish financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms, and an alternative definition of the serial SEO issuer dummy. 
Our work contributes to the SEO and capital structure literature by highlighting the 
notion that serial SEOs have an impact on corporate capital structure, which is significantly 
different to single SEO firms’ capital structure. Moreover, our study provides useful insights 
and implications for potential agencies. We show that serial issuers are more leveraged 
compared to single issuers, and this is a factor about which bondholders and potential 
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investors should be aware. In addition, the market in which the issuing company is listed 
plays a role in the sensitivity of cash holdings and debt positions when there is an increase 
in cash flow. Finally, our findings reveal that financial constraint conditions can affect the 
use of the equity proceedings raised, thus some firms may need to consider whether serial 
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Serial and single SEO issuers. 
                    
 N 
 
Avg. no issues t-diff 
 All MM AIM  All MM AIM  
AIM vs. 
MM 
Serial SEOs 666 255 411  
4.7 4.15 5.04 
 
-3.22 
Single SEO 367 211 156     
Total 1,033 466 567             
                    
Note: This table shows the split between serial (serial issues dummy = 1) and SEO issuers for 
both the London Main Market and Alternative Investment Market 1995-2015. Single issuers are 
defined as firms which made one SEO during the sample period. Serial issuers are firms which 


















8,062 0.687 1 
 
- - - 
 
- - - 
 
- 
Leverage (market) 8,062 0.232 0.181 
 
5,535 0.24 0.192 
 
2,527 0.214 0.163 
 
-4.869 
ROA 8,062 -0.063 0.043 
 
5,535 -0.084 0.034 
 
2,527 -0.017 0.064 
 
7.936 
Growth 8,062 1.309 1.016 
 
5,535 1.331 1.017 
 
2,527 1.26 1.015 
 
-2 
CAPEX 8,062 0.049 0.027 
 
5,535 0.048 0.025 
 
2,527 0.05 0.029 
 
1.122 
Tangible Assets 8,062 0.26 0.157 
 
5,535 0.261 0.15 
 
2,527 0.259 0.179 
 
-0.32 
Size 8,062 4.636 4.567 
 
5,535 4.649 4.566 
 
2,527 4.608 4.571 
 
-2.051 
Short-to-total Debt 8,062 0.466 0.396 
 
5,535 0.457 0.379 
 
2,527 0.483 0.424 
 
2.998 
Age  8.062 2.238 2.303 
 
5,535 2.234 2.197 
 




             
 
Serial issuers 
    
Single issuers 
     
 
Min Max St.Dev. 5% 95% 
 
Min Max St.Dev. 5% 95% 
  
Leverage (market) 0 0.841 0.225 0 0.706 
 
0 0.841 0.214 0 0.672 
  




-3.576 0.506 0.344 -0.518 0.233 
  
Growth 0 13.695 1.577 0.435 2.973 
 
0 13.7 1.437 0.517 2.242 
  
CAPEX 0 0.445 0.069 0 0.187 
 
0 0.445 0.066 0.001 0.177 
  
Tangible Assets 0 0.946 0.279 0.003 0.871 
 
0 0.946 0.249 0.006 0.798 
  
Size 1.869 6.957 0.978 3.155 6.48 
 
1.869 6.957 0.781 3.433 5.993 
  
Short-to-total Debt 0 1 0.364 0 1 
 
0 1 0.356 0.001 1 
  
Age  0 3.85 0.999 0.693 3.714   0 3.85 0.981 0.693 3.638     
Note: Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as well as serial issuer and single issuer subsamples, of UK firms issuing equity 
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during 1995–2015. Serial SEOs is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm issued more than one SEO during the sample period and 
0 otherwise. ROA is equal to the ratio of EBITt to ((Total Assetst + Total Assetst-1)/2) and is not in percentage terms. Growth here is defined as the 
ratio of Total Assets Turnover at time t over the Total Assets Turnover a time t-1. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) are standardised using Total 
Assets. Tangible assets variable here is defined as property, plant and equipment over total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of Total Assets and 
Age the natural logarithm of age in years. Note that the variables refer to the lagged values of the reported variables, since the lagged data are used 













debt CAPEX ROA Size 
Multiple 
SEOs 
Growth 1        
Tangible Assets -0.036 1       
Age  -0.179 0.089 1      
Short/Total debt 0.043 -0.237 -0.085 1     
CAPEX 0.028 0.484 -0.111 -0.094 1    
ROA -0.298 0.126 0.209 -0.130 -0.009 1   
Size -0.168 0.201 0.395 -0.369 0.005 0.427 1  
Multiple SEOs 0.022 0.003 -0.007 -0.033 -0.012 -0.085 0.021 1 
Note: This table reports correlations among the different variables included in our study. The variables 




Determinants of leverage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample MM AIM Full sample MM AIM 
Serial SEOs (dummy) 0.029*** 0.026** 0.028** 0.030*** 0.029** 0.028** 
 (3.126) (1.999) (2.211) (3.250) (2.276) (2.215) 
ROA -0.018 -0.069** -0.005    
 (-1.188) (-2.233) (-0.389)    
Growth -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.495) (-0.287) (0.314) (-0.128) (0.310) (0.389) 
CAPEX -0.254*** -0.300*** -0.147** -0.249*** -0.311*** -0.145** 
 (-4.622) (-3.713) (-2.270) (-4.576) (-3.769) (-2.275) 
Tangible Assets 0.181*** 0.202*** 0.145*** 0.180*** 0.198*** 0.145*** 
 (7.014) (4.910) (4.792) (6.902) (4.617) (4.796) 
Size 0.024*** 0.021** 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.0134 0.033*** 
 (3.249) (1.989) (3.229) (2.753) (1.273) (3.174) 
Short-to-total Debt -0.076*** -0.088*** -0.062*** -0.076*** -0.090*** -0.062*** 
 (-6.080) (-5.115) (-3.838) (-6.064) (-5.132) (-3.838) 
Age  0.021*** 0.008 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.009 0.039*** 
 (4.288) (0.968) (6.830) (4.295) (1.092) (6.801) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,062 4,483 3,579 8,062 4,483 3,579 
Adj. R2 0.226 0.301 0.173 0.226 0.297 0.173 
Note: This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions for the entire sample as well as the Main Market (MM) and AIM subsamples of 
UK firms conducting SEOs during the 1995–2015 period. The dependent variable is market Leverage, defined as the ratio of book value of Debt 
over the market value of Total Assets. Serial SEOs is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm issues equity more than once during 
the period examined and 0 otherwise. ROA is equal to the ratio of EBITt over ((Total Assetst + Total Assetst-1)/2). Growth here is defined as the 
ratio of Total Assets Turnover at time t over the Total Assets Turnover a time t-1. Capital Expenditures are standardised using Total Assets. Size 
is the natural logarithm of Total Assets and Age the natural logarithm of age in years. The independent variables are lagged one period to take 
into account potential endogeneity issues. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of the results at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Year 
dummies, two-digit SIC code industry dummies as well as a constant, are included in the regression (results not reported here). Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity as well as firm and year clustering. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 5  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single SEOs. 
 Full sample   Serial SEOs   Single SEOs  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 


















𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.180***   -0.182***   -0.212***  
 (-20.57)   (-17.00)   (-13.28)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.367***   -0.355***   -0.422*** 
  (-31.40)   (-24.54)   (-20.67) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  -0.193***   -0.213***   -0.036 
  (-3.459)   (-3.149)   (-0.418) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.047*   0.053   0.026  
 (1.691)   (1.478)   (0.616)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.016** 0.159***  0.015* 0.154***  0.017 0.193*** 
 (2.243) (23.99)  (1.782) (19.84)  (1.146) (14.39) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 -0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.002**  -0.003** -0.003* 
 (-1.424) (1.199)  (-0.685) (2.249)  (-2.148) (-1.733) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.001 -0.012***  0.001 -0.011***  -0.001 -0.013*** 
 (1.100) (-11.24)  (1.118) (-8.581)  (-0.492) (-6.161) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.104 0.211  0.109 0.190  0.161 0.335 
N 7,318 7,318  5,073 5,073  2,245 2,245 
Note: This table reports results from the 3SLS regressions with year and industry as fixed effects (Equations 4.2 and 4.3) for debt issuance and 
cash holdings, following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). The results are reported for the entire sample of UK firms’ SEOs 1995–2015 
(Columns 1 and 2) as well as the subsamples of Serial SEOs (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Firms are serial SEO issuers 
if they have conducted SEOs more than once during our sample period. 
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Table 6  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single SEOs on London MM and AIM. 
 MIM      AIM     
 Serial SEOs   Single 
SEOs 
  Serial SEOs   Single 
SEOs 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 




























𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.179***   -0.210***   -0.245***   -0.228***  
 (-11.41)   (-11.44)   (-15.64)   (-7.977)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.311***   -0.338***   -0.436***   -0.530*** 
  (-16.71)   (-14.14)   (-19.42)   (-14.30) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  -0.200**   0.017   -0.213***   -0.163 
  (-2.267)   (0.202)   (-2.676)   (-0.974) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.136**   0.024   0.017   0.014  
 (2.208)   (0.326)   (0.422)   (0.259)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.029* 0.170***  0.138*** 0.301***  0.016 0.152***  -0.002 0.153*** 
 (1.702) (12.17)  (4.243) (11.91)  (1.511) (15.07)  (-0.105) (7.430) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.002 0.010***  -0.006*** 0.006**  -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.006*** 
 (1.509) (7.053)  (-2.760) (2.395)  (-1.256) (-0.710)  (-1.274) (-2.664) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.000 -0.005***  -0.003 -0.011***  -0.005** -0.016***  0.000 -0.021*** 
 (0.174) (-2.988)  (-1.290) (-5.160)  (-2.288) (-6.376)  (0.017) (-4.404) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.128 0.134  0.253 0.300  0.153 0.255  0.191 0.397 
N 2,585 2,585  1,463 1,463  2,488 2,488  782 782 
Note: This table reports results from 3SLS (with year and industry fixed effects) models for debt issuance and cash holdings following the approach 
of Acharya et al. (2007). Our sample consists of UK firms conducting SEOs during the period 1995-2015. Results are reported for serial and single 
issuers listed on London’s Main Market (MM) in columns 1 & 2 and 3 & 4 respectively. Similar results for firms listed on AIM are reported in 
columns 5 to 8. 
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Table 7  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by firm size. 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.218*** -0.225***   -0.213*** -0.207***   -0.233*** -0.316*** 




























































N 2,233 2,090   1,611 1,559   622 531 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.538*** -0.176***   -0.510*** -0.157***   -0.613*** -0.353*** 






























































N 2,233 2,090   1,611 1,559   622 531 
Note: This table reports results estimated from the 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and 
cash holdings, following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). (Un)constrained firms proxies are using the asset size of the issuing firm (per year). 
The results are reported for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK firms issuing equity during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 
and 2) as well as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Firms are considered serial issuers if they 
have conducted SEOs more than once during our sample period. Panel A contains the results for cash flow sensitivity of debt while Panel B the 
results for cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings.  
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Table 8  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by dividend payout ratio. 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.229*** -0.126***  -0.231*** -0.111***  -0.257*** -0.202*** 
 (-18.04) (-7.600)  (-15.81) (-5.005)  (-9.016) (-7.387) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.009 0.141  0.007 0.246  0.016 0.201 
 (0.281) (0.844)  (0.169) (1.133)  (0.317) (1.099) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.021** -0.011  0.021** 0.003  0.008 -0.025 
 (2.346) (-0.184)  (2.089) (0.0292)  (0.382) (-0.302) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 -0.001 0.003  -0.000 -0.003  -0.004** 0.009* 
 (-1.211) (0.714)  (-0.125) (-0.591)  (-2.543) (1.933) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.005*** 0.001  -0.004** -0.001  -0.009** -0.001 
 (-2.867) (0.271)   (-2.281) (-0.199)  (-2.430) (-0.211) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.144 0.168  0.154 0.166  0.204 0.232 
N 3,601 1,881  2,737 1,202  864 679 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.455*** -0.124***  -0.427*** -0.119***  -0.551*** -0.214*** 
 (-24.96) (-8.475)  (-19.96) (-6.578)  (-15.92) (-7.754) 
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∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.262*** 0.096  -0.253*** 0.108  -0.0985 0.056 
 (-3.755) (1.031)  (-3.163) (0.801)  (-0.719) (0.584) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.164*** 0.154***  0.157*** 0.249***  0.184*** 0.135** 
 (17.93) (4.003)  (15.20) (4.626)  (9.080) (2.360) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.004  -0.004* 0.009** 
 (0.538) (-0.282)  (1.262) (-0.985)  (-1.649) (2.342) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.017*** 0.002  -0.017*** 0.004***  -0.025*** -0.003 
 (-8.580) (1.504)  (-7.070) (2.854)  (-5.253) (-1.354) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.253 0.095  0.231 0.138  0.418 0.183 
N 3,601 1,881  2,737 1,202  864 679 
Note: This table reports results of 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and cash holdings, 
following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). (Un)constrained firms are proxied by the dividend payout ratio (dividends per share / earnings 
per share) of the issuing firm (per year). Results are reported for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK firms issuing 
equity during 1995-2015 (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). 
Firms are considered serial SEO issuers if they conducted SEOs more than once in the sample period. Panel A is for cash flow sensitivity of debt 




Table 9  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by SA index. 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.231*** -0.178***  -0.234*** -0.179***  -0.244*** -0.209*** 
 (-18.18) (-14.21)  (-15.56) (-11.01)  (-9.885) (-9.808) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.030 0.184**  0.028 0.201**  0.030 0.067 
 (1.000) (2.371)  (0.738) (2.111)  (0.667) (0.597) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.019** 0.054**  0.018* 0.056**  0.014 0.045 
 (2.359) (2.288)  (1.893) (1.968)  (0.893) (0.846) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 -0.001* 0.002  -0.001 0.002  -0.003** 0.001 
 (-1.689) (0.769)  (-0.615) (0.980)  (-2.369) (0.264) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.006*** -0.003*  -0.007*** -0.003  -0.004 -0.006** 
 (-3.846) (-1.679)  (-3.329) (-1.292)  (-1.293) (-2.020) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.154 0.099  0.169 0.101  0.210 0.160 
N 3,714 3,604  2,599 2,474  1,115 1,130 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.445*** -0.230***  -0.428*** -0.232***  -0.507*** -0.313*** 
 (-25.19) (-16.69)  (-19.77) (-13.83)  (-16.83) (-11.63) 
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∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.278*** 0.048  -0.254*** -0.011  -0.086 0.050 
 (-3.791) (0.889)  (-2.985) (-0.165)  (-0.635) (0.641) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.166*** 0.126***  0.159*** 0.136***  0.192*** 0.133*** 
 (18.79) (7.516)  (15.59) (6.949)  (10.81) (3.350) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.000 0.007***  0.001 0.005***  -0.005** 0.017*** 
 (-0.025) (4.109)  (1.009) (2.884)  (-2.466) (4.718) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.021*** -0.004***  -0.019*** -0.004***  -0.028*** -0.001 
 (-9.248) (-3.112)  (-7.077) (-2.660)  (-6.433) (-0.269) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.249 0.134  0.237 0.152  0.397 0.191 
N 3,714 3,604  2,599 2,474  1,115 1,130 
Note: This table reports results of 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and cash holdings, 
following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). (Un)constrained firms are proxied by the SA (size-age) index developed by Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010). Firms with above median SA index score are defined as constrained and those below median as unconstrained. The results are reported 
for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK firms issuing equity during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the 
subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Firms are considered serial SEO issuers if they conducted 




Determinants of leverage: alternative serial SEO dummy definition. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample MM AIM Full sample MM AIM 
Serial SEOs (dummy) 0.019* 0.022* 0.017 0.020** 0.025* 0.017 
 (1.941) (1.714) (1.351) (2.024) (1.943) (1.364) 
ROA -0.011 -0.048 -0.008    
 (-0.758) (-1.623) (-0.562)    
Growth 0.003 -0.000 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.007 
 (0.733) (-0.010) (1.370) (0.925) (0.413) (1.485) 
CAPEX -0.328*** -0.370*** -0.230** -0.327*** -0.379*** -0.227** 
 (-4.636) (-3.579) (-2.547) (-4.620) (-3.630) (-2.526) 
Tangible Assets 0.203*** 0.229*** 0.167*** 0.203*** 0.229*** 0.167*** 
 (7.174) (5.577) (4.619) (7.179) (5.571) (4.639) 
Size 0.029*** 0.019* 0.046*** 0.027*** 0.015 0.044*** 
 (3.723) (1.754) (4.455) (3.457) (1.426) (4.774) 
Short-to-total Debt -0.068*** -0.087*** -0.050*** -0.068*** -0.088*** -0.049*** 
 (-5.544) (-5.097) (-3.401) (-5.566) (-5.130) (-3.398) 
Age  0.011* 0.002 0.026*** 0.011* 0.002 0.025*** 
 (1.796) (0.223) (2.894) (1.795) (0.282) (2.851) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,969 3,462 2,507 5,969 3,462 2,507 
Adj. R2 0.226 0.276 0.189 0.226 0.275 0.189 
Note: This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions for the entire sample as well as the Main Market (MM) and AIM subsamples of 
UK firms conducting SEOs 1995–2015. The dependent variable is market Leverage, defined as the ratio of book value of Debt over the market 
value of Total Assets. Serial SEOs is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company conducted more than one SEO after the current 
year (not over the whole sample period 1995–2015) and 0 otherwise. ROA is equal the ratio of EBITt over ((Total Assetst + Total Assetst-1)/2). 
Growth is defined as the ratio of Total Assets Turnover at time t over the Total Assets Turnover a time t-1. Capital Expenditures are standardised 
using Total Assets. Size is the natural logarithm of Total Assets and Age the natural logarithm of age in years. Year dummies, two-digit SIC 
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code industry dummies as well as a constant are included in the regression (results not reported here). Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and firm and year clustering. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. All variables are winsorised at 2.5% on both tails. 
Independent variables are lagged one period in order to take into account potential endogeneity issues. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance of the results at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 11  
Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: alternative serial SEO dummy definition. 
 
 Full sample   Serial SEOs   Single SEOs  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 


















𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.157***   -0.162***   -0.184***  
 (-17.10)   (-12.96)   (-13.15)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.307***   -0.289***   -0.346*** 
  (-25.17)   (-17.30)   (-18.83) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  -0.106   -0.111   -0.075 
  (-1.522)   (-1.197)   (-0.842) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.093***   0.126**   0.038  
 (2.718)   (2.557)   (0.829)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.009 0.180***  0.002 0.163***  0.027 0.237*** 
 (0.891) (19.40)  (0.173) (13.47)  (1.608) (15.97) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.001 0.004***  0.002 0.005**  -0.000 0.003 
 (1.100) (2.714)  (1.209) (2.482)  (-0.343) (1.460) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.002** -0.010***  0.003** -0.010***  0.000 -0.013*** 
 (2.234) (-9.853)  (2.100) (-6.781)  (0.045) (-5.956) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.099 0.213  0.111  0.191  0.152 0.308 
N 5,286 5,286  3,041 3,041  2,245 2,245 
Note: This table reports results estimated from the 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance 
and cash holdings, following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). The results are reported for the entire sample of UK firms issuing equity 
during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Serial 
SEO issuers is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company conducted more than one equity issue after the current time and not the 




Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers on London MM and AIM: alternative serial SEO dummy definition. 
 MIM      AIM     
 Serial SEOs   Single 
SEOs 
  Serial SEOs   Single 
SEOs 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 




























𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.148***   -0.193***   -0.248***   -0.201***  
 (-7.904)   (-11.14)   (-13.37)   (-8.290)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.262***   -0.321***   -0.339***   -0.405*** 
  (-11.89)   (-13.67)   (-13.14)   (-12.60) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  -0.101   0.003   -0.121   -0.264 
  (-0.803)   (0.028)   (-1.176)   (-1.556) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.200**   0.067   0.053   0.032  
 (2.283)   (0.917)   (0.951)   (0.558)  
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 -0.010 0.154***  0.091*** 0.282***  0.019 0.163***  0.014 0.196*** 
 (-0.380) (7.763)  (3.034) (11.60)  (1.228) (9.811)  (0.665) (8.095) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 -0.002 0.005**  -0.003 0.008***  0.005** 0.002  0.002 -0.003 
 (-0.909) (1.982)  (-0.918) (2.629)  (2.381) (0.804)  (0.591) (-0.700) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 0.001 -0.004*  0.001 -0.004*  0.0051 -0.016***  0.004 -0.015*** 
 (0.392) (-1.923)  (0.392) (-1.923)  (0.192) (-5.188)  (1.202) (-3.690) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.144 0.167  0.210 0.272  0.168 0.250  0.184 0.355 
N 1,598 1,598  1,463 1,463  1,443 1,443  782 782 
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Note: This table reports results from 3SLS (with year and industry fixed effects) models for debt issuance and cash holdings, following the approach 
of Acharya et al. (2007). Our sample consists of UK firms issuing equity during the period 1995–2015. Serial SEOs is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if the company conducted more than one equity issue after the current year and not the whole time period 1995–2015, and the value 
of 0 otherwise. Results are reported for serial and single SEOs listed in the London primary Main Market (MM) in columns 1 & 2 and 3 & 4, 
respectively. Similar results for firms listed on AIM are reported in columns 5 to 8.  
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Appendix A  
Variable definitions. 
Variable  Definitions 
Leverage Book value of debt over market value of assets 
Serial SEO (dummy) Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the firm 
conducts more than one SEO during the sample period and 
0 otherwise 
ROA Ratio of EBITt over ((Total Assetst + Total Assetst-1)/2) 
Growth Ratio of Total Assets Turnover at time t over the Total 
Assets Turnover a time t-1 
CAPEX Capital expenditures standardised using total assets 
Tangible Assets Property, plant and equipment over total assets 
Size Total assets in natural logarithm 
Short-to-total Debt Ratio of short-term debt over total debt 
Age  Age in years, in natural logarithm 
ΔDebt Ratio of the changes in long-term debt over total book 
value of assets 
ΔCash Hold Ratio of changes in cash and cash equivalents over total 
book value of assets   
Cash Flow Proxy for free cash flow. Calculated as: [(Operating 
income - depreciation & amortisation – income tax – 
payment to debt holders– payment to equity holders) / total 
assets] 
Q Proxy for investment opportunities. It is the ratio of the 
market value of assets over book value of assets. 
Sales size The natural log of sales 
Debt Ratio of total long-term debt over total assets 







Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by firm size (alternative serial SEO dummy 
definition). 
 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.199*** -0.191***  -0.203*** -0.182***  -0.213*** -0.271*** 
 (-12.26) (-9.531)  (-8.859) (-6.591)  (-8.643) (-8.521) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.002 0.230  0.024 0.349**  0.025 -0.258* 
 (0.505) (1.638)  (0.403) (2.000)  (0.511) (-1.673) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.011 0.014  0.006 -0.012  0.013 0.051 
 (0.921) (0.242)  (0.341) (-0.148)  (0.697) (0.500) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.003 -0.008  0.005** 0.003  0.001 -0.018 
 (1.831) (-1.400)  (2.312) (0.385)  (0.449) (-1.630) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.007*** -0.016***  -0.005 -0.014***  -0.007** -0.028*** 
 (-2.827) (-5.562)  (-1.380) (-3.671)  (-1.966) (-4.946) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.163 0.201  0.188 0.207  0.225 0.302 
N 1,625 1,499  867 1,010  758 489 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.401*** -0.244***  -0.368*** -0.243***  -0.433*** -0.410*** 
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 (-16.50) (-10.84)  (-10.41) (-8.566)  (-13.31) (-8.927) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.334*** 0.062  -0.316* 0.144  -0.210 -0.056 
 (-2.629) (0.921)  (-1.777) (1.576)  (-1.198) (-0.709) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.194*** 0.121***  0.181*** 0.143***  0.212*** 0.218*** 
 (12.90) (3.280)  (8.930) (3.006)  (9.186) (3.234) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.005* 0.010**  0.005 0.004  0.002 0.015* 
 (1.943) (2.427)  (1.438) (0.767)  (0.472) (1.732) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.021*** -0.006**  -0.024*** -0.002  -0.020*** -0.004 
 (-5.452) (-2.537)  (-4.272) (-0.798)  (-3.813) (-0.986) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.294 0.141  0.283 0.133  0.420 0.267 
N 1,625 1,499  867 1,010  6758 489 
Note: This table reports results estimated from the 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and 
cash holdings, following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). (Un)constrained firms are proxied by the asset size of the issuing firm (per year). 
Results are reported for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK firms issuing equity during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 and 
2) as well as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Firms in our sample are considered serial 
SEO issuers if they have issued equity more than once during our sample period. Panel A contains the results for cash flow sensitivity of debt 





Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by dividend payout ratio (alternative serial 
SEO dummy definition). 
 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.213*** -0.115***  -0.228*** -0.117***  -0.214*** -0.185*** 
 (-16.34) (-5.804)  (-13.71) (-3.628)  (-9.280) (-6.761) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.039 0.110  0.071 -0.021  0.016 0.285* 
 (1.065) (0.791)  (1.383) (-0.100)  (0.299) (1.744) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.014 0.016  0.008 0.171  0.016 0.010 
 (1.211) (0.244)  (0.522) (1.237)  (0.741) (0.129) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.001 0.004  0.004* -0.005  -0.003 0.008* 
 (0.848) (0.926)  (1.946) (-0.647)  (-0.998) (1.775) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.000 -0.003  0.002 -0.004  -0.005 -0.003 
 (-0.641) (-1.566)   (0.782) (-1.291)  (-1.571) (-0.947) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.156 0.185  0.170 0.249  0.210 0.212 
N 2,558 1,349  1,676 703  882 646 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.373*** -0.179***  -0.338*** -0.184***  -0.436*** -0.224*** 
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 (-19.42) (-9.730)  (-13.95) (-6.867)  (-13.82) (-7.898) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.262*** 0.118  -0.205** 0.085  -0.299** 0.102 
 (-3.063) (0.919)  (-1.996) (0.434)  (-2.033) (0.915) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.189*** 0.111**  0.168*** 0.341***  0.230*** 0.083 
 (14.27) (2.277)  (10.39) (3.709)  (9.653) (1.348) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.003 0.002  0.004 -0.011**  -0.001 0.009** 
 (1.385) (0.509)  (1.329) (-2.307)  (-0.327) (2.526) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.015*** 0.003*  -0.015*** 0.009***  -0.019*** -0.002 
 (-7.276) (1.926)  (-5.680) (3.765)  (-4.712) (-0.898) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.244 0.141  0.225 0.264  0.367 0.184 
N 2,558 1,349  1,676 703  882 646 
Note: This table reports results of 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and cash holdings, 
following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). The dividend payout ratio (dividends per share / earnings per share) of the issuing firm (per year) 
is used as a proxy to identify (un)constrained firms. The results are reported for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK 
firms issuing equity during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 and 2) as well as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 
5 and 6). Firms are considered serial SEO issuers if they conducted more than one SEO in the sample period. Panel A is for cash flow sensitivity 









Cash flow sensitivity of debt and cash holdings for serial and single issuers: financial constraint proxied by SA index (alternative serial SEO 
dummy definition). 
 
PANEL A: Cash flow sensitivity of debt       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.181*** -0.184***  -0.191*** -0.210***  -0.201*** -0.198*** 
 (-13.84) (-13.28)  (-10.87) (-10.80)  (-9.985) (-9.405) 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 0.052 0.160**  0.059 0.203**  0.058 0.031 
 (1.442) (2.107)  (1.143) (2.042)  (1.181) (0.291) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.009 0.075***  0.005 0.088***  0.017 0.055 
 (0.789) (3.108)  (0.322) (2.889)  (0.878) (1.208) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.000 0.003  0.002 0.005  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.232) (1.188)  (1.125) (1.406)  (-0.805) (0.343) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000  -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.617) (0.074)  (0.043) (0.408)  (-0.519) (-0.839) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.149 0.133  0.172 0.179  0.188 0.159 
N 2,685 2,601  1,532 1,509  1,153 1,092 
PANEL B: Cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings       
 Full sample   Serial SEO firms  Single SEO firms 
 Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 
 
Constrained  Unconstrained 





𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.352*** -0.267***  -0.332*** -0.276***  -0.388*** -0.297*** 
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 (-19.46) (-16.01)  (-13.29) (-12.46)  (-14.93) (-10.88) 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.213** 0.079  -0.180 0.100  -0.014 -0.073 
 (-2.031) (1.289)  (-1.325) (1.354)  (-0.102) (-0.800) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 0.196*** 0.106***  0.173*** 0.097***  0.243*** 0.169*** 
 (15.61) (5.407)  (10.59) (3.919)  (12.18) (4.501) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 0.004* 0.003  0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 
 (1.800) (1.271)  (1.332) (1.078)  (0.467) (1.229) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.018*** -0.003***  -0.019*** -0.002  -0.019*** -0.003 
 (-8.032) (-2.634)  (-5.888) (-0.975)  (-5.543) (-1.571) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.247 0.149  0.233 0.165  0.367 0.189 
N 2,685 2,601  1,532 1,509  1,153 1,092 
Note: This table reports the results of 3SLS regressions with year and industry fixed effects (equations 2 and 3) for debt issuance and cash holdings, 
following the approach of Acharya et al. (2007). The SA (size-age) index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) is used as proxy to identify 
(un)constrained firms. Firms with above median SA index score are defined as constrained and below median as unconstrained. The results are 
reported for constrained and unconstrained firms for the entire sample of UK firms issuing equity during 1995–2015 (Columns 1 and 2) as well 
as the subsamples of serial issuers (columns 3 and 4) and single issuers (columns 5 and 6). Firms are serial SEO issuers if they conducted more 
than one SEO in the sample period. Panel A is for cash flow sensitivity of debt and Panel B for cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings.  
 
